For instance, both Democrats and Republicans agree that the threat to U.S. safety from Islamic terrorism is serious and that rogue states and failed states are major problems because they can offer assistance to terrorists. Furthermore, this consensus also holds that the threat of nuclear terrorism from non-state actors is so great that the United States must be willing to take extraordinary measures to keep suspicious states that might be in league with such actors from acquiring nuclear weapons. Even the deeply contentious U.S.-led war in Iraq has produced only tactical differences between Democrats and Republicans, Posen said, pointing out that Democrats who bitterly opposed Bush over the war have often done so on relatively narrow grounds. For instance, they blast the administration for the poor quality of U.S. intelligence related to Iraq’s alleged weapons of mass destruction and question if this was the result of honest error or manipulation. They also criticize the administration for bungling the occupation and reconstruction of Iraq and the subsequent counterinsurgency campaign. “Few Democrats argue that Iraq could and should have been contained and deterred rather than invaded. It’s even harder to find advocates of containment and deterrence toward Iran,” Posen said. “Democrats and Republicans have agreed that we should use our power in effect to create more power. They have agreed that our power gives us a chance to transform international politics. We have a rather ambitious, rather energetic and rather costly grand strategy.” This grand activist strategy preferred by both parties “has a classically tragic quality about it,” Posen wrote in his American Interest essay. “Enabled by its great power, and fearful of the negative energies and possibilities engendered by globalization, the United States has tried to get its arms around the problem: It has essentially sought more control. But the very act of seeking more control injects negative energy into global politics as quickly as it finds enemies to vanish. It prompts states to balance against U.S. power however they can, and it prompts people to imagine that the United States is the source of all their troubles.” By contrast, Posen says a grand strategy of restraint requires that the United States find ways to shape—rather than to control—international affairs. In broad terms, the United States should husband its power, reassess alliances, and stop offering subsidies to allies that are pursuing policies that aren’t consistent with U.S. interests. “My purpose is to get those who have been doing too little, to do more, and those who have been doing too much, to do less,” he noted. According to Posen, the reasons why U.S. leaders have embarked on such an ambitious international agenda since the Cold War can be broken down into four factors: The first is unipolarity. Put simply, the United States emerged from the Cold War as one of the most powerful nations in history. U.S. defense spending exceeds the rest of world combined, and the nation has control of what Posen calls the global commons: the sea, the air and space. Second, the United States operates in a world in which many pressing problems arise from internal discord driven by ethnic tensions. He cites the Kurdish and Shiite revolts in Iraq after the 1991 Gulf War, as well as the fighting in Somalia, Bosnia, Rwanda and Kosovo. Third, although there are no major global power competitors to the United States, a number of nations and groups have learned how to challenge American power. The combination of adequate conventional weapons, large numbers of committed young men, proven tactics, and competent training adapted to environments that favor infantry have all inflicted significant combat costs on U.S. ground forces around the world. Finally, the intensity of international trade and investment—i.e. globalization—makes it easy for political entrepreneurs to blame foreigners for local problems. Similarly, the enhanced ability to communicate and travel makes it possible for like-minded groups in different countries to find each other, organize and cooperate. The interaction of these forces has drawn the United States into costly national security policies that produce new problems faster than they can solve old ones, Posen argues, and the great concentration of power within the United States skews the security policy debate toward activism. But Posen believes that if the global distribution of power were more equal, the United States would have to be more cautious about the projects it chose. “The interaction of great U.S. power, the re-emergence of identity politics and the forces unleashed by globalization have produced not only a fractious world, but one the U.S. is sorely tempted to administer,” he said. Posen does agree that safety is the U.S.’s most imminent security problem, but he cautions that although al Qaeda and other groups can attack the United States, they can’t destroy or conquer the nation. Moreover, given that it spends nearly $500 billion a year for defense programs, the United States should be able to come up with better answers to security questions than costly preventive wars. One of those solutions is to bolster the U.S.’s image as a “good guy.” For instance, Posen believes the United States should undertake positive projects in the developing world such as the humanitarian aid it provided to Southeast Asia after the tsunami of December 2004. And although the United States should participate in some humanitarian interventions, he said these missions should have reasonable guidelines, be in alliance with international coalitions, and operate under a legitimate mandate. Posen also advised that the United States reduce its presence within “the abode of Islam” by abandoning permanent or semi-permanent land bases in Arab countries and lowering the profile of its military and security cooperation with Arab states. In addition, the United States should focus less on the export of democracy and more on promoting the rule of law, press freedom, and the rights of collective bargaining. On the timely issue of Iran, Posen believes the United States needs a more measured view of the risks of nuclear proliferation, arguing that the U.S. government needs to avoid preventive wars if at all possible and that clear deterrent statements and strong nuclear forces are preferable because they are a more credible and sustainable policy. Notably, in an article titled “We Can Live With a Nuclear Iran” published in the New York Times in February 2006—long before the recent report that Iran halted its nuclear weapons program back in 2003—Posen argued that logistical realities would prevent a massive arms race in the Middle East even if Iran were to ever acquire nuclear weapons. In addition, “to threaten, much less carry out, a nuclear attack on a nuclear power is to become a nuclear target. Anyone who attacks the United States with nuclear weapons will be attacked with many, many more nuclear weapons. Israel almost certainly has the same policy,” he wrote. “U.S. policymakers feel compelled to trumpet that all options, including force, are on the table when dealing with ‘rogue’ state proliferators,” Posen later wrote in the American Interest. “But preventive war must never become either a casual or a default policy choice. It has serious and probably enduring political costs, which the United States need not incur. Deterrence is still a better strategy.” John Shaw is a contributing writer for The Washington Diplomat.

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